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The study of reciprocal altruism, or the exchange of goods and services be-
tween individuals, requires attention to both evolutionary explanations
and proximate mechanisms. Evolutionary explanations have been de-
bated at length, but far less is known about the proximate mechanisms of
reciprocity. Our own research has focused on the immediate causes and
contingencies underlying services such as food sharing, grooming, and co-
operation in brown capuchin monkeys and chimpanzees. Employing both
observational and experimental techniques, we have come to distinguish
three types of reciprocity. Symmetry-based reciprocity is cognitively the
least complex form, based on symmetries inherent in dyadic relationships
(e.g., mutual association, kinship). Attitudinal reciprocity, which is more
cognitively complex, is based on the mirroring of social attitudes between
partners and is exhibited by both capuchin monkeys and chimpanzees. Fi-
nally, calculated reciprocity, the most cognitively advanced form, is based
on mental scorekeeping and is found only in humans and possibly chim-
panzees.
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Cooperation can be deﬁned by either its intention or its outcome. In the
ﬁrst case, we focus on the efforts and goals of the involved parties. In the
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second case, we focus on results, and ignore actions that fail to bring about
those results.
Most of the literature on the evolution of cooperation implicitly or ex-
plicitly employs the second deﬁnition, usually phrased in terms of ﬁtness
consequences for the actors. Thus, Hamilton (1964) has deﬁned coopera-
tion as either having ﬁtness beneﬁts for both the actor and the recipients
or beneﬁtting only the recipient at a cost to the actor. Emphasis on out-
comes goes back much further as exempliﬁed by Hayes (1925:340), who
declared that “The only thing designated by the word co-operation is the
relation between activities that contribute to a common result.” Such deﬁ-
nitions are not grounded in actual behavior, however. As pointed out by
Boesch and Boesch (1989), cooperation should not be deﬁned so narrowly
that it leaves out cooperative effort. Deﬁnitions that rely on outcome alone
become problematic if the conclusion of a behavioral sequence is un-
known or if efforts fail even when the actors were working together, such
as the common situation in which predators jointly stalk a prey that sub-
sequently escapes. Dugatkin (1997:14) has tried to remedy this situation by
deﬁning a cooperative act and a cooperative effort differently:
Cooperation is an outcome that—despite potential relative costs to the indi-
vidual—is “good” in some appropriate sense for the members of a group,
and whose achievement requires collection action. But the phrase “to coop-
erate” can be confusing, as it has two common usages. To cooperate can
mean either: (1) to achieve cooperation—something the group does, or (2) to
behave cooperatively, that is, to behave in such a manner that renders the co-
operation possible (something the individual does), even though the coop-
eration may not actually be realized unless other group members also
behave cooperatively.
Several other aspects of cooperation are often only implicitly considered
in previous deﬁnitions. First, actors need not be intentionally cooperating,
and second, they may attempt to exploit one another. For this article, we
deﬁne cooperation as the voluntary acting together of two or more individuals
that brings about, or could potentially bring about, an end situation that beneﬁts
one, both, or all of them in a way that could not have been brought about individ-
ually. Thus deﬁned, cooperation does not require the actors to be aware
that they must cooperate in order to succeed, nor does it exclude failures
to achieve a cooperative goal. This deﬁnition suits our focus on process
rather than outcome and reﬂects our interest in proximate mechanisms.
Key to understanding cooperation is distinguishing between, while at
the same time trying to combine, theories of ultimate causation with a
careful study of proximate mechanisms. Ultimate causation theories, or
theories of the evolution of cooperation, attempt to ascertain the reasons
for a behavior’s existence in a species’ repertoire. Proximate mechanismsProximate Perspective on Reciprocal Altruism 131
are the actual cognitive capacities and response patterns that evolved in
the animal to fulﬁl these evolutionary requirements.
Paradoxically, although it is necessary to differentiate between proxi-
mate and ultimate explanations in order to understand what exactly is
being studied and which questions to ask, it is also necessary to seek an un-
derstanding of both. Although research often focuses exclusively on one or
the other, no phenomenon can be fully understood by looking at only the
evolutionary explanation or the proximate mechanisms. What animals re-
veal in their actual behavior are the proximate mechanisms. They pursue
immediate goals which, in the end, often beyond the cognitive horizon of
the actors themselves, translate into beneﬁts that form the material for nat-
ural selection. Astudy of proximate mechanisms helps to determine if evo-
lutionary hypotheses are predicting behavior within the animal’s range of
abilities, as no matter how elegant or compelling an evolutionary scenario,
it is useless if the organism lacks the capability of behaving as the theory
predicts (Stamps 1991). While much debate has focused on the evolution-
ary mechanisms underlying cooperation, much less is known of the proxi-
mate mechanisms.
Our interest is in this proximate side of cooperation or, more speciﬁcally,
reciprocal altruism. Our research on the proximate mechanisms underly-
ing food sharing and cooperation in capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) and
chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) has given us a better understanding of the
phenomenon. Here we discuss examples of previous reciprocity studies,
then our own research on proximate mechanisms of reciprocity in pri-
mates and what we have learned from it.
PROXIMATE MECHANISMS OF RECIPROCAL ALTRUISM
Reciprocal altruism is the exchange of goods or services (costly acts) be-
tween individuals such that one individual beneﬁts from an act of the
other, and then the other individual beneﬁts in return. This differs from
mutualism, another common form of cooperation, in which receipt of the
beneﬁt is simultaneous by all parties involved rather than temporally sep-
arated. High-cost reciprocity is quite rare, one purported example being
blood sharing in vampire bats (Desmodus rotundus; Wilkinson 1984). Low-
cost reciprocity, on the other hand, encompasses services such as mating
privileges, grooming (Seyfarth and Cheney 1988; de Waal 1997a), the fail-
ure to act (Seyfarth and Cheney 1988), or any service that carries an op-
portunity cost. This may involve the exchange of a much wider range of
phenomena than those traditionally termed altruistic. For example, ago-
nistic intervention on behalf of another individual is sometimes risky for
the intervener and advantageous for the beneﬁciary (e.g., when a female132 Human Nature, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2002
defends her offspring against an attack by a dominant male), but more
often intervention is directed against subordinates and hence is relatively
risk-free (reviewed by Harcourt and de Waal 1992). One must be careful in
an analysis of reciprocal interactions not to lump both high-cost and low-
cost, opportunistic interactions in the same analysis (e.g., male baboon
alliances: Bercovitch 1988; Noë 1990). For this reason, we use the term rec-
iprocity to encompass both high-cost (altruistic) and low-cost (service)
exchanges.
Examples of reciprocity are scarce among nonhuman animals because
demonstrating it is difﬁcult. The majority of such research comes from so-
cial species in which large amounts of observational data have been col-
lected, as these studies are more likely to yield possible avenues for
exploring reciprocal interactions. Many examples of reciprocity have been
posited in the literature, but often it is found that either the animals are re-
lated, and hence kin selection provides an alternative explanation for the
observed altruistic exchange (Wilkinson 1988), or else previously unno-
ticed beneﬁts to the presumed altruist are found, indicating that the ob-
served behavior is better described as mutualism (e.g., both animals
receive a beneﬁt simultaneously; Clements and Stephens 1995; Koenig
1988) or pseudo-reciprocity (Connor 1986). Furthermore, it is difﬁcult to
assess reciprocity in situations in which the exchanged currencies are not
the same. This has been termed a service economy (de Waal 1982, 1997a) or
biological market (Noë and Hammerstein 1991, 1994), in which different
goods and services are exchanged within a network of individuals. More-
over, in some instances the same currency will have a different relative
value to different individuals, based on such factors as the animal’s rank,
size, or age (Seyfarth and Cheney 1988; Boyd 1992).
Proposed examples of reciprocity have been found in a number of dif-
ferent species. Here, we brieﬂy review how some of these studies have
raised important issues in the study of reciprocity, after which we will look
at our own attempts to document and explain reciprocity in capuchin
monkeys and chimpanzees.
Coercion versus Free Exchange
If cooperation is the voluntary working together of two individuals to
achieve some end, then an interaction may appear cooperative without so
being. Individuals can be coerced into performing actions which at ﬁrst
appear cooperative, but lack the voluntary nature of cooperation. Dyads
and groups of related keas (Nestor notabilis) were given access to a lever-
like apparatus that released food pellets from one end if a bird stood on the
other end (Tebbich et al. 1996). The bird standing on the lever did not have
access to the food pellets. The mechanism the keas used to solve this prob-Proximate Perspective on Reciprocal Altruism 133
lem was coercion: the dominant bird would force a subordinate to stand
on the lever while the dominant ate.
In dyads, this led to a noncooperative system in which one animal did
all the work and reaped no rewards. However, the dominance hierarchy
was nonlinear, so every bird was dominant to some other bird. Hence in
the group situation, every animal was able to obtain some reward, which
superﬁcially resembled a system of reciprocal exchange. However, the ex-
change of favors was not reciprocal at the dyadic level; in other words,
there did not seem to be a contingency between A’s help to B and B’s help
to A. Such a system would not yield the same results in a linear dominance
hierarchy, as one individual would receive favors from all involved while
another would receive favors from no one. This is seen in the following sit-
uation in chimpanzees.
A socially housed group of related chimpanzees was exposed to an ap-
paratus in which they had to pull two handles simultaneously to receive
fruit (Chalmeau 1994; Chalmeau and Gallo 1996). One individual could
claim all of the reward, and in fact, the alpha male monopolized the re-
wards and failed to share with his partners. Possibly for this reason, only
the youngest infant of the group (a two-year-old female) would use the ap-
paratus with the alpha male, who actively recruited her. Once again, labor
was recruited from down the dominance hierarchy, but unlike the keas,
the chimpanzee subordinate was not forced to participate; all help was re-
cruited and appeared voluntary. Further unlike the keas, the dominance
order was linear so the alpha male received all of the rewards. However,
the reward was not likely a factor for the infant female, who was not yet
dependent on solid foods and was probably rewarded with play
(Chalmeau 1994; Chalmeau and Gallo 1996).
Piscine Predator Inspection
Predator inspection among ﬁsh, particularly sticklebacks (Gasterosteus
aculeatus) and guppies (Poecilia reticulata), is a behavior that has received a
large amount of attention as a possible example of the tit-for-tat (TFT) so-
lution to the prisoner’s dilemma (Milinski 1987; Milinski et al. 1990; Hunt-
ingford et al. 1994; Dugatkin 1991, 1998; but see Dugatkin 1997 for the ﬁery
debate on predator inspection and TFT). In this behavior, two or more ﬁsh
break away from a school to swim closer to an approaching predator. Most
likely they gain information on the state of the predator (e.g., its state of ac-
tivity and alertness), and the rest of the school may learn from their reac-
tions (Magurran and Higham 1988), but they also incur greater risks by
getting closer to a predator than the rest of the school. If predator inspec-
tion enhances the survival of the individual members, how do they know
with whom to cooperate to maximize their ﬁtness?134 Human Nature, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2002
Experimental work using a “partner” simulated by a mirror has been
done on ﬁsh of both species (Milinski 1987; Dugatkin 1991, 1997). The mir-
rors could be adjusted to simulate a defecting companion or a cooperating
one, and in both cases the ﬁsh followed a “conditional approach” strategy
(Dugatkin 1988)—that is, they monitored their partner visually and only
continued to advance if their partner continued to do so as well. Further-
more, guppies apparently recognize cooperative tendencies in partners,
prefering to associate with better inspectors.
In an experiment in which three guppies were placed in lanes next to
each other and allowed to perform a predator inspection, guppies pre-
ferred to associate, both immediately after the inspection and 4 hours later,
with the individual that maintained the closest average position to the in-
spector (Dugatkin and Alﬁeri 1991). However, when a similar preference
test was repeated on groups of six free-swimming guppies, there was no
evidence for assortative interactions (Dugatkin and Wilson 2000). Appar-
ently guppies can alter their interactions based on their partner’s level of
cooperation, although the extent to which this is possible is unknown.
Impala Mutual Grooming
Impala (Aepyceros melampus) take turns grooming their partner’s head
and neck to remove ticks and other parasites (Hart and Hart 1992). Each
episode consists of multiple alternating grooming bouts, in which the ini-
tiator is typically the ﬁrst to groom. Allogrooming is a low-cost form of rec-
iprocity involving low energy expenditure and risk, because if a bout is not
reciprocated, the initiator has lost little. Connor (1995) suggests that this is
an example of the parceling model of reciprocity. In this model, goods are
exchanged in small packets, rather than single, long bouts, making the cost
of a defecting partner lower and reciprocity more viable than in situations
in which high-cost goods or services are exchanged. Furthermore, in im-
pala allogrooming the beneﬁts are not separated very much in time, mak-
ing the mechanism for such a cooperative behavior similar to mutualism.
Bat Reciprocal Blood Sharing
Blood sharing by vampire bats involves a much higher cost than impala
allogrooming, and the time delays between given and received acts are far
longer. Female bats are long-lived animals that roost for life in the same
small group in which relatedness is slightly less than that of cousins. To
survive, they cannot go longer than three days without a blood meal, and
adults miss a meal about once every 10 days. These females exchange
blood meals with conspeciﬁcs who have failed to feed for one or more
nights in a row (Wilkinson 1984). This behavior is very costly, and it is pos-
sible that bats remember favors given and received for an extended periodProximate Perspective on Reciprocal Altruism 135
of time, as time delay between giving and receiving is a minimum of one
day.
Wilkinson (1984) reported that the vast majority of blood sharing is be-
tween mother and offspring, with the remainder among closely related in-
dividuals or frequent roost-mates. Since there was no evidence that giving
was contingent on previous receipt from the same individual, it is possible
that the observed reciprocity results from the symmetrical components of
the relationship (i.e., kinship and mutual friendship) rather than any score-
keeping and expectation of return (see “symmetry-based reciprocity,”
below).
Primate Reciprocity
Correlational evidence for reciprocity in nonhuman primates exists for
social grooming, food sharing, and agonistic support (e.g., Seyfarth 1980;
de Waal and Luttrell 1988; de Waal 1989). However, correlations between
given and received acts of assistance across dyadic relationships can come
about in multiple ways. Before concluding that giving depends on receiv-
ing, potentially confounding variables need to be controlled for. The most
obvious variable to control is time spent in association: if members of a
species preferentially direct favors to close associates, the distribution of
favors will automatically be reciprocal owing to the symmetrical nature of
association. This mechanism, dubbed symmetry-based reciprocity, needs to
be distinguished from calculated reciprocity, which is based on mental
scorekeeping of given and received favors (de Waal and Luttrell 1988). In
most species for which reciprocal altruism has been reported, symmetry-
based reciprocity is the most likely mechanism (e.g., blood sharing in vam-
pire bats, Wilkinson 1984; allogrooming in impala, Hart and Hart 1992).
In view of the problems with correlational analyses at the matrix level,
assessments need to return to the interaction level, with sequences of be-
havior analyzed over time. Does a beneﬁcial act by individual Atoward B
increase the probability of a subsequent beneﬁcial act by B toward A? Pre-
liminary evidence for an exchange between afﬁliative behavior and ago-
nistic support, and vice versa, exists for cercopithecine monkeys. De Waal
and Yoshihara (1983) found increased post-conﬂict attraction and groom-
ing between previous alliance partners in rhesus monkeys (Macaca mu-
latta). Seyfarth and Cheney (1984) used playbacks of calls that vervet
monkeys (Cercopithecus aethiops) use to both threaten an aggressor and so-
licit support to gauge the reaction of individuals that had recently been
groomed by the caller. They reported more attention to previous grooming
partners. Finally, Hemelrijk (1994) examined agonistic support after ex-
perimentally manipulating grooming among long-tailed macaques (M.
fascicularis) and found indications that support was related to previous136 Human Nature, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2002
grooming—in other words, individual Asupported individual B more if B
had groomed A, but not if Ahad groomed B.
The last study comes closest to demonstrating a temporal connection be-
tween one service and another, but what is still missing is evidence for
partner-speciﬁcity, in other words, that the return service is speciﬁcally
targeted at the individual who offered the ﬁrst service. Our research on
food sharing and cooperation attempted to address this issue of partner-
speciﬁcity in reciprocity.
Food Sharing in Primates
Food sharing may be a component of reciprocal exchange. Although
food sharing outside the mother-offspring or immediate family context is
rare in the majority of primate species (reviewed by Feistner and McGrew
1989), it is common in both capuchin monkeys and chimpanzees. Food
sharing lends itself uniquely to experimental research because the quan-
tity and type of food available, the initial possessor of the food, and even
the amount of food shared can be manipulated by the experimenter. Sec-
ond, food sharing provides a quantiﬁable currency. An observer can see
exactly how many times the non-possessor obtains food and can estimate
quantities shared. Finally, the observer can tell whether the sharing was
active or passive.
Active food-sharing, a rare behavior, consists of one individual handing
or giving food to another individual; passive food-sharing, by far the more
common kind, consists of one individual obtaining food from another
without the possessor’s active help. Passive food-sharing covers a broad
spectrum, ranging from a lack of protest against others’ taking of food to
a category called “facilitated taking” in which the food possessor could
easily prevent the other from taking food, by staying out of reach, yet nev-
ertheless comes close enough for food transfers to occur.
Three hypotheses have commonly been proposed to explain food
sharing in primates: sharing-under-pressure, sharing-to-enhance-status, and
reciprocity (reviewed by de Waal 1989). The sharing-under-pressure hy-
pothesis, related to the tolerated theft hypothesis (Blurton Jones 1987), pre-
dicts that individuals will share in order to be left alone by potentially
aggressive conspeciﬁcs. The sharing-to-enhance-status hypothesis pre-
dicts that sharing will increase the altruist’s standing in the community.
Finally, the reciprocity hypothesis predicts that food is exchanged recipro-
cally for other favors (e.g., is a part of the service economy). Our research
attempts to verify whether food sharing is reciprocally distributed as well
as to separate these three hypotheses.
Food sharing in capuchins. Capuchin monkeys spontaneously share food
(de Waal et al. 1993), so we investigated whether or not these interactions
were reciprocal. There are two ways to examine reciprocity. The ﬁrst is toProximate Perspective on Reciprocal Altruism 137
Figure 1. This sketch, made from an actual video still, demonstrates active food
sharing in a pair of capuchin monkeys. The monkeys are separated by a mesh
partition, and the monkey on the right has access to a food bowl containing
apples. Active food sharing, depicted here, is quite rare, but facilitated taking,
in which the food possessor drops pieces by the mesh and allows the other
monkey to take them, is very common (from de Waal 1997b).
look for signiﬁcant reciprocity correlations between dyads; the second,
more detailed method examines changes within each relationship across
time. Our initial studies approached food sharing in the ﬁrst way, looking
for reciprocal sharing across dyads. This matrix approach has been used
successfully in the study of grooming, alliances, and food sharing (cf. de
Waal and Luttrell 1988; de Waal 1989; Hemelrijk 1990a, 1990b).
This initial study (de Waal 1997b) looked for reciprocity correlations
across dyads using the delayed exchange test, or DET. For each DET, a pair
of monkeys was placed in a test chamber and separated from each other
by a mesh partition which allowed for food sharing. Monkey Awas given
a bowl of cucumber pieces, which were placed well out of reach of mon-
key B. After 20 minutes, the cucumber was removed, and a bowl of apples
was given to monkey B (second test phase). The same pair was given an-
other DET later, with the order in which the monkeys were given food
being reversed (Figure 1). As a control, each monkey was given the same
test for 20 minutes, but without a partner. 
The capuchins displayed an astonishing amount of social tolerance,
sharing food on a reciprocal basis. Males tended to share more than fe-
males in this experiment, regardless of the sex of the partner. A matrix
analysis found that, for the 14 female-female dyads in which the possessor
was dominant, more sharing occurred between partners with fewer ago-
nistic interactions, shorter rank distances (i.e., animals who were close to-
gether in the dominance hierarchy), and higher levels of proximity.138 Human Nature, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2002
Furthermore, the number of tolerant food transfers in the ﬁrst test phase
was signiﬁcantly correlated with the number of tolerant food transfers in
the second phase. Although cognitive mechanisms such as scorekeeping
were not contradicted by these ﬁndings, the most parsimonious mecha-
nism given the result is symmetry-based reciprocity—that is, reciprocity
based on the symmetrical nature of the relationship. The capuchins were
already familiar with each other, and food sharing might have resulted
from a combination of afﬁliation and tolerance toward conspeciﬁcs. Our
next concern was whether or not reciprocity could be attributed to any-
thing besides the symmetry inherent in the relationship.
In an attempt to exclude symmetry-based reciprocity as an explanation
for the observed reciprocity in food sharing, changes within each relation-
ship over time were examined rather than just correlations across dyads.
This test was similar to the previous one but incorporated six DETs for
each pair. For each DET, individual A was given apple pieces for 20 min-
utes, and then these were removed and individual B was given carrot
pieces for 20 minutes. The roles between individuals remained the same
over the six tests. The results were compared across tests to see how shar-
ing in the second test phase was affected by sharing in the ﬁrst test phase
between the same individuals. This approach allowed us to correlate
events over time, rather than across relationships, tightening a possible ar-
gument for causality between the behavior in both directions within each
dyad. Sharing rates were found to co-vary signiﬁcantly over time within
each pair of individuals, indicating that something more than symmetry-
based reciprocity was occurring (de Waal 2000).
The second food possessor shared signiﬁcantly more than average if the
ﬁrst monkey had shared more than average as well (Figure 2). To measure
this, we ascertained the mean amount of food each individual shared with
their partner, then ranked each test as “high” or “‘low” food sharing, as
compared with the mean amount of food shared with that partner. There
was no correlation between rate of food transfer and test order in either
test phase, indicating that the measured correlation could not be attributed
to test-ordering effects (i.e., a general rising or falling of food transfers over
consecutive tests). 
Symmetry-based reciprocity cannot account for such temporal covaria-
tion within the same dyad. However, calculated reciprocity, or mental
scorekeeping, may still be too cognitively complex a mechanism for the ca-
puchins to utilize. To explain these results, de Waal (2000) proposed the
mechanism of attitudinal reciprocity,that is, each individual’s behavior mir-
rors the partner’s attitude in close temporal succession (Figure 3). This ex-
planation is simpler than calculated reciprocity, which assumes a literal
accounting of given and received services. Instead of the monkeys keep-
ing careful track of how much they give and receive, they may merely re-Proximate Perspective on Reciprocal Altruism 139
Figure 2. The rate of food transfer toward the partner during the second phase of
the Delayed Exchange Test is compared with the rate of transfer received from
the same partner during the ﬁrst DET phase. Data for 16 different female
dyads, each tested six times, indicate signiﬁcant covariation of sharing in both
directions within each dyad (from de Waal 1997b).
spond positively (e.g., with proximity and tolerance) to a positive attitude
in their partner. Inasmuch as the amount of food transferred between part-
ners rests on proximity and tolerance, such mirroring of social predisposi-
tions could explain the reciprocal distribution of food sharing across time
without the requirement of careful scorekeeping of services. 
Food for grooming in chimpanzees. Similarly to capuchins, chimpanzees
share food in a reciprocal manner. De Waal (1989) previously found that
food sharing and other social interactions (e.g., grooming) were recipro-
cally distributed across individuals, with half of the recorded food inter-
actions (50.3%) resulting in food being transferred. However, food sharing
in this test correlates positively with association, or the amount of time
individuals spend in proximity in non-food situations, so, as with the ca-
puchins, the effects of association must be removed before any explana-
tion other than symmetry-based reciprocity may be invoked. In order to
look at reciprocity without the confounding effects of mutual association,
the matrix analysis was redone while statistically controlling for its effects.
The reciprocity correlation continued to be signiﬁcant. However, statistical
elimination of a variable is not nearly as powerful as eliminating the vari-
able experimentally.
To that end, a new experiment was designed that looked for temporal
patterning within each dyad, thereby holding the effect of association con-
stant. For this test, partner speciﬁcity was addressed: Does a beneﬁcial act
by A toward B affect B’s behavior only toward A or toward everyone (de140 Human Nature, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2002
Figure 3. The layout for the cooperative-lever-pressing paradigm in capuchin
monkeys. The monkeys had to press the two levers simultaneously to receive
a grape juice reward: (a) the initial design, in which the monkeys were sepa-
rated and each monkey had its own lever and juice dispenser, and (b) the
follow-up design, in which the monkeys were together for both the lever-
pressing and the reward. Under the ﬁrst condition, the monkeys did not at-
tend to each other’s behavior and only succeeded by chance. When the
monkeys were forced into contact with each other and moved together from
levers to juice dispensers, they appeared to attend to each other and their suc-
cess increased (see Figure 4).
(b)
(a)
Waal 1997a)? To do this, one must ascertain whether B’s receipt of a favor
by A makes B more likely to share food with A only, or with any individ-
ual, and A’s and B’s behavior must be measured sequentially.
The difﬁculty in measuring food sharing across time is that after a group-
wide food-sharing session, as used in these experiments, the motivation to
share is changed (the animals are more sated). Hence, food sharing cannotProximate Perspective on Reciprocal Altruism 141
be the only variable measured. Asecond service that is unaffected by food
consumption needs to be included, and for this, grooming between indi-
viduals prior to food-sharing bouts was used. The frequency and duration
of spontaneous grooming among the chimpanzees was measured during a
90-minute period. Within half an hour after the end of these observations,
the apes were given two tightly bound bundles of leaves and branches, and
all interactions over food were recorded.
Adults were found to be more likely to share food with individuals who
had groomed them earlier in the day. In other words, if Agroomed B in the
morning, B was more likely than usual to share food with A later in the
same day. This result, however, could be explained in two ways. The ﬁrst
is the “good-mood hypothesis,” in which individuals who have received
grooming are in a benevolent mood and respond by sharing with all indi-
viduals. The second explanation is the exchange hypothesis, in which the
individual who has been groomed responds by sharing food only with 
the groomer. The data indicated that the sharing was speciﬁc to the previ-
ous groomer. In other words, each chimpanzee appeared to remember
another who had just performed a service (grooming) and responded to
that individual accordingly (shares food). This is compelling evidence for
exchange.
Moreover, grooming between individuals who rarely did so was found
to have a greater effect on sharing than grooming between partners who
commonly groomed. Among partnerships in which little grooming was
usually exchanged, there was a more pronounced effect of previous
grooming on subsequent food sharing. There are several possible inter-
pretations. Grooming from a partner who doesn’t usually groom might 
be more noticeable, leading the food possessor to share more. Second, 
perhaps individuals who groom frequently are close associates and thus
keep less careful track of favors. Finally, it could be evidence of calculated
reciprocity; not only do the chimpanzees regulate their food sharing based
on previous grooming, but they recognize unusual effort and reward
accordingly.
This study strongly suggests memory-based, partner-speciﬁc exchanges
in chimpanzees. It goes beyond symmetry-based reciprocity because the
same dyads are compared at different times; hence the symmetrical aspect
stays constant and cannot explain the observed contingencies. It is also
more complex than attitudinal reciprocity because the reciprocation is
more than an immediate response to the positive predisposition of the
partner. In this chimpanzee study, more so than in the previously dis-
cussed capuchin experiment, the time delay between favors given and re-
ceived was signiﬁcant and hence the favor was acted upon well after the
previous positive interaction. So far, this exchange of grooming and food
in chimpanzees is the example that most closely resembles calculated rec-
iprocity among any reported for nonhuman species.142 Human Nature, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2002
Cooperation in Capuchins
In primates, food sharing among unrelated adults functions to reward
(e.g., rewards for fellow hunters: Boesch 1994) or as an exchange for ser-
vice or support (e.g., coalitions and alliances: de Waal 1997a). Much of the
food sharing in chimpanzees involves sharing the carcass after a coopera-
tive hunt (Boesch 1994). Since food sharing may have evolved in the con-
text of cooperative ventures, we began to explore whether food sharing
was more common or more pronounced after individuals had cooperated,
using paradigms that incorporate both food sharing and cooperation.
Despite a study indicating that capuchins fail to understand coopera-
tion (Chalmeau, Visalberghi, and Gallo 1997), we focused on this species
because preliminary work in our own laboratory had indicated a high
level of cooperation. After observing several different cooperative tasks,
we found that capuchins do in fact understand cooperation if the ap-
proach used is intuitive to them.
A hard-to-understand paradigm. In Chalmeau, Visalberghi, and Gallo’s
(1997) study, capuchins were initially trained to pull a handle toward
themselves to receive a reward. After this, the monkeys were trained to
pull their handles at the same moment as the others to receive the same
reward. The capuchins did succeed at this task; however, Chalmeau, Visal-
berghi, and Gallo (1997) concluded that they failed to understand cooper-
ation because the number of successes across trials did not increase
signiﬁcantly and because the mean rate of pulling by each individual did
not depend on whether its partner was present at the handles.
Why were capuchins unable to learn the contingencies of cooperation?
One problem is in the analysis (Chalmeau, Visalberghi, and Gallo 1997). To
calculate the rate of pulling when a partner was near versus away from the
handles, the investigators used absolute pulling frequencies instead of the
rates of pulling corrected for time. The absolute pulling frequency does
not tell us how the monkeys are actually using their time at the handles.
For example, pulling 100 times in 50 minutes with the partner present and
100 times in 200 minutes with the partner absent means that different
pulling rates are used even if the total frequencies are the same. Capuchins
are extremely dexterous and prone to manipulate objects (Fragaszy and
Adams-Curtis 1991); hence some degree of manipulation of any object is
to be expected regardless of the situation.
This ﬂaw in the analysis doesn’t necessarily mean that Chalmeau, Visal-
berghi, and Gallo’s (1997) conclusions were wrong. We recently conducted
an experiment that was quite similar, which helped us understand why
this is a difﬁcult task for capuchin monkeys. In our unpublished experi-
ment, conducted by Matthew Campbell and the two present authors, the
capuchins had to press levers simultaneously to receive a grape-juice
reward from a nearby dispenser (Figure 3a). Although almost all of theProximate Perspective on Reciprocal Altruism 143
Figure 4. The success rates for two female capuchins in the second design, in
which they were forced into contact (Figure 3b). Each point represents the av-
erage success rate (number of successful presses per overall number of
presses) for a test. One subject had a much higher success rate than the other
monkey, meaning that more of her presses obtained rewards. She appears to
be the only one to have learned the contingency between her partner’s press-
ing and her own success.
capuchins initially learned to press a lever to receive juice, only one pair of
monkeys received juice in the cooperative task. It was clear, however, that
they were not coordinating but had simply learned to press the levers rap-
idly and frequently until they received the reward by chance.
Following this, the design was changed so that the levers were posi-
tioned on one side of the test chamber and the juice dispensers on the other
(Figure 3b), forcing the monkeys to move together between the two sides.
We hoped this forced contact would lead to communication and coordina-
tion between the monkeys, and a realization of the other’s necessity for suc-
cess. However, once again we had only one successful pair. Moreover, only
one of that pair learned that she required the other for success. This indi-
vidual’s success rate, but not the other’s, increased over the course of the
10 trials (Figure 4). Her pressing rate increased when her partner was close
to the other lever (within arm’s reach) as opposed to when her partner was
distant from the levers, implying her cognizance that her partner’s pres-
ence was necessary for success. We attempted to test our successful coop-
erator with other capuchins to see how her understanding would affect
their success, but since she was low ranking her behavior was inhibited in
the presence of high-ranking companions. 
This one monkey’s coordination of her own behavior with another indi-
vidual’s random efforts is similar to the deliberate coordination by only144 Human Nature, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2002
one partner in other cooperative studies on chimpanzees (Chalmeau 1994;
Chalmeau and Gallo 1996) and orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus: Chalmeau,
Lardeux et al. 1997). In chimpanzees, success was achieved when one in-
dividual (the alpha male) understood the task and then recruited and co-
ordinated with his partner (an infant female), who acted at random. In a
similar experiment on a pair of male orangutans, one male actively re-
cruited his partner, monitored his movements, and anticipated the reward,
apparently understanding the task better than his partner. Although we
saw no evidence of recruitment, one monkey’s understanding of the task
was apparently better than the other’s, allowing the two to complete the
task successfully.
Why did most of the monkeys fail this task when they seemed to mas-
ter the contingencies of another cooperative task, to be described below, so
easily? We think it is because the task was not intuitive to them. First, the
apparatus did not change as their efforts became more accurate, so the
monkeys could not monitor the results of their unsuccessful attempts.
Since lever-pressing did not change as the capuchins got closer to receiv-
ing juice, there was no way for the monkeys to sense when they were get-
ting closer to a solution. Furthermore, the monkeys received no kinesthetic
feedback from their partner. Failure of the partner to perform the right ac-
tions was not felt or easily noticed except in the lack of reward. After ex-
amining this, we began a bar-pulling trial that seemed intuitive in the
areas in which lever-pressing was not.
The advantage of an intuitive task. The basic paradigm was similar to one
developed by Crawford (1937) for juvenile chimpanzees. In our case, two
capuchin monkeys had to work together to pull in a counterweighted tray,
at which point one or both of them would be rewarded. They were placed
in the test chamber and separated from each other by a mesh partition, giv-
ing them the option to share food, or not. Each monkey had its own bar to
pull in the tray, although these bars could be removed for control tests.
Food was placed in transparent bowls so each monkey could see which
one would receive the food (Figure 5).
Initially, monkeys were taught to pull in the tray individually, which
they quickly learned. At this point (and throughout the experimental pe-
riod, which lasted three years) each monkey was given regular strength
tests to determine how much weight he or she could pull in individually.
For trials in which only one monkey pulled, the tray was weighted just
under what the individual could pull. For trials in which both monkeys
pulled, the tray was weighted more heavily than the strongest individual
could pull alone, but somewhat lighter than their combined strengths.
Tests were done on seven same-sex pairs of adult capuchins housed in the
same social group. Each test consisted of four 10-minute trials. The ﬁve test
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Figure 5. The test chamber used for the cooperative pulling task in capuchin mon-
keys. Two monkeys are situated in adjacent sections of the test chamber, sep-
arated by a mesh partition. The apparatus consists of a counter-weighted tray
with two removable pull bars. In the solo effort test, only one monkey had a
pull bar and only this individual’s food cup was baited. In the mutualism test,
both monkeys were required to pull their respective pull bars, and both food
cups were baited. In the cooperation test, both monkeys were required to pull,
but only one individual’s food cup was baited (drawing by S. Brosnan).
1. Solo effort test (SOL), in which only one monkey had a pull-bar and
only this individual received food, although both monkeys were
present in the test chamber. This required no cooperation.
2. Mutualism, or double test (DBL), in which both monkeys were re-
quired to pull together and both cups were baited.
3. Cooperation test (COP), in which both monkeys were required to
pull together but only one food cup was baited. This represented al-
truism on the part of the helper.
4. Obstructed view test (OBS), which was the same as the COP test ex-
cept that the mesh partition was replaced by an opaque one. This
eliminated visual communication between the monkeys, but they
still could see both cups on the tray, and they could see that only one
was baited.
5. Unrestricted cooperation test (UCP), which was the same as the
COP test except that the partner was free to move in and out of the
test chamber, which had an open connection to part of the group
cage. This meant that the helper, needed for successful pulls, was
not always at hand.146 Human Nature, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2002
Figure 6. Mean (+SEM) success rate for the cooperation test applied to capuchin
monkeys; in one test (COP) both partners had visual contact and in the other
(OBS) the view was obstructed by a panel between the partners. Data are pre-
sented separately for the four trials in each test, showing that success drops
dramatically when visual coordination is prevented (from Mendres and de
Waal 2000).
As expected, the success rate of cooperative trials was signiﬁcantly
lower than that of mutualistic tests or solo efforts. In the unrestricted co-
operation tests, bar-pulling attempts by the food possessor signiﬁcantly
decreased when the partner left the test chamber, indicating that the mon-
keys had learned to associate their partner’s presence with successful
pulling. They might even have made the more complex association that
they could only succeed if their partner helped and that their partner
could not help if absent.
Bar-pulling success also decreased signiﬁcantly in the obstructed view
tests as opposed to the cooperation tests (Mendres and de Waal 2000; Fig-
ure 6). In the obstructed view test, vocal communication was still possible
and the monkeys continued to make pulling efforts at the same rate as in
the cooperation tests. Since both monkeys could see the food cups, their
success rates should not have decreased if the impetus to pull simply
stemmed from seeing food. What changed was their ability to see each
other’s behavior, indicating that success was at least partially dependent
on visual coordination with the partner. The failure to succeed when vi-
sual access was cut off indicates that the monkeys were paying attention
to each other’s actions and potentially coordinating their efforts. This re-
sult contradicts previous claims that capuchins don’t understand the need
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Cooperation and food sharing. One central question underlying this project
was whether food sharing would increase in the context of a cooperative
enterprise. In a service economy, food can be exchanged for assistance in
cooperation, or the converse. Our analyses of the amount of food sharing
indicated that capuchins share signiﬁcantly more in successful coopera-
tive trials than in solo effort trials, in which the partner is present, but does
not, and actually cannot, assist (de Waal and Berger 2000).
Furthermore, the partner pulled more frequently after successful trials.
Since 90% of successful trials included food transfers to the helper, ca-
puchins are assisting in pulling more frequently after having received food
in the previous trial. The simplest interpretation of this result is that moti-
vational persistence results in continued pulling after successful trials. But
a causal connection is, of course, also possible—in other words, that
pulling after successful trials is a response to the obtained reward and the
expectation of more.
The most cognitively demanding interpretation of these results is that
the food possessor understands that its partner has helped and that the
partner must be rewarded for cooperation to continue. This would repre-
sent calculated reciprocity, in which the exchange of favors on a one-on-
one basis drives reciprocal altruism. Each individual understands the
other’s costs (assistance in pulling or loss of food) and returns the favor.
This could even represent a form of “gratitude” (a concept to which
Trivers alluded in 1971, in relation to reciprocal altruism), in which indi-
viduals pay each other back for a previous service or favor.
However, a more likely explanation of the cooperation and food sharing
in these trials is a variation on attitudinal reciprocity, in which the posses-
sor and partner feel closer after a coordinated effort. The attention and co-
ordination that the cooperative trial entails may induce a positive attitude
in the partner, which is expressed in social tolerance and mutual attrac-
tion, which in turn ultimately translates into food sharing. After a food-
sharing episode, similar mechanisms lead to increased pulling by the
partner and hence further cooperation. This would indicate that a mecha-
nism similar to that suggested for reciprocal food sharing is at work (de
Waal 2000).
Although one of our tasks failed to demonstrate an understanding of co-
operation in capuchin monkeys, we found that, with a relevant, intuitive
task, capuchins are quite good at performing, and apparently understand-
ing, cooperative tasks. The mechanism most likely to underlie cooperation
and sharing in capuchins is attitudinal reciprocity. In this case, partners in
cooperation are mirroring the attitude shown by their partner. This is sep-
arate from symmetry-based reciprocity because these attitudes are not
symmetrical characteristics of the relationship but vary across time and
circumstances.148 Human Nature, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2002
CONCLUSION
Although theories about the evolution of cooperation are well established,
proximate mechanisms have been much less studied. We are interested in
proximate mechanisms of reciprocity, that is, the immediate behavioral
goals that animals pursue and what they understand about them, which
ultimately contribute to the animal’s ﬁtness.
The cognitively least demanding proximate explanation is symmetry-
based reciprocity in which individuals interact based on symmetrical fea-
tures of their relationship: these features make both parties react similarly
to each other (de Waal and Luttrell 1988). This mechanism requires no
scorekeeping because reciprocation is based on preexisting features of 
the relationship, such as kinship, mutual association, or age similarity.
The second mechanism of reciprocity is attitudinal reciprocity, in which an
individual’s willingness to cooperate co-ﬂuctuates with the attitude that
the partner shows or has recently shown toward them (de Waal 2000).
This divorces cooperative interactions from the symmetrical state of the
relationship, making them contingent on the immediately preceding
behavior of their partner. The involvement of memory and scorekeeping
may be rather minimal in this kind of exchange, however, because the
critical variable is general social predisposition rather than precise costs
and beneﬁts of exchanged behavior. The third mechanism is calculated
reciprocity, in which individuals appear to reciprocate on a behavioral 
one-on-one basis (de Waal and Luttrell 1988). This requires memory of
previous events, some degree of scorekeeping, partner-speciﬁc contin-
gency between given and received favors, and perhaps even punishment
of cheaters. Our research has indicated examples of both symmetry-based
and attitudinal reciprocity in brown capuchin monkeys and possible cal-
culated reciprocity in chimpanzees. It is logical to expect that calculated
reciprocity, with its higher cognitive requirements, will be found only in a
few species whereas cognitively less demanding forms of reciprocity will
be more widespread. Thus, we tend to assume, unless evidence to the
contrary is reported, that any reciprocal altruism reported in the literature
is symmetry-based.
One factor that has made scholars skeptical about the existence of reci-
procity among unrelated individuals has been a concern about how such
behavior could possibly have evolved in the face of its high initial costs. It
has recently been suggested, however, that cooperation could evolve if,
following a minimum initial investment, cooperators increased their in-
vestment contingent on increasing conﬁdence in the relationship (Roberts
and Sherratt 1998). All of the forms of reciprocity described above have
been found in relatively low-cost exchanges and may have been a starting
point for the evolution of more risky and costly forms of reciprocity. Thus,Proximate Perspective on Reciprocal Altruism 149
strictly speaking, exchanges of grooming for abundant food may not qual-
ify as reciprocal altruism, in that the costs are low, but this sort of service
exchange may have formed the evolutionary starting point for more costly
forms of exchange.
Both cooperation and reciprocity are far more complex than they ini-
tially appear. Most research thus far has focused on ultimate causation, but
cooperation cannot be fully understood without equal attention being
given to the proximate mechanisms. When new knowledge of proximate
mechanisms is combined with the evolutionary viewpoint, a more com-
plete picture emerges, allowing us to understand how behaviors such as
reciprocal altruism have evolved and persisted.
Our review greatly beneﬁtted from a stimulating conference on animal coopera-
tion organized by Dr. C. Boesch at the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary An-
thropology, in Leipzig, Germany, in 1999.
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